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The meaning and importance of death in existential
psychology are investigated.

Four major theorists are

presented, i.e. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Rank, and Binswanger
Their interpretation of death in man's personal development,
although with different perspectives, nevertheless is seen
as having a basic common theme:

It is necessary for the

person to free himself from the chains of conformity in
order to become an individual.

By realizing one's poten-

tialities one also must realize and understand one's
finitude.

Thus by facing death one may actively and cou-

rageously move through the anxiety of this life in the
shadow of death.
These theories are focused on the classic schizophrenic case of Ellen West.

The case is presented in light

of Binswanger's existential analysis.

It involves the

meaning of the struggle of life and death.

Particular

emphasis is placed upon Ellen's decision to take her own
life.

Existentialists view her suicide as an enrichment of

her own personal being, in that it constitutes an active

concern for her self-authenticity.

Ellen's decision is

also seen as a longing for immortality and a desire to go
"beyond" her individuality.

vi

Introduction
This thesis is primarily concerned with the existential
tradition within philosophy and psychology.

That concept

death
of essential importance, however, is the concept of
and the meaning and role death has come to play in the
various existential theories of man.

An attempt will there-

ant
fore be made to present and to integrate the most import
t.
existential thoughts related to this particular concep
Individual consideration will first be given to such
naer.
thinkers as Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Rank, and Binswa
c case
An existential analysis of the classic schizophreni
ate the
of Ellen West will follow, which will try to integr
perspectives of these individuals.

The author of the

may become
present thesis believes that the case in question
views on
particularly interesting, when various existential
death are considered.

It is hoped then that the conclusion

nwill constitute a synthesis of all the mentioned existe
death.
tialists regarding their thoughts on the concept of
Initially, however, it may be appropriate to explain
the
briefly various ideas that are inextricably tied to
understanding of death as existentialism views it.

We

ation of
commonly think of death as the biological termin
to
a living organism, whose vital organs have ceased
1
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function.

However, if we go beyond this obviously concrete

and impersonal definition, death becomes private and more
psychological in its implication.

Consequently, the exis-

tential idea of the concept is a lot more than mere physical
or biological non-existence.

It is central and, therefore,

important to man's continuous and never ending effort to
make sense and meaning out of his own life.

As will be

seen, however, the existentialists tell us that by taking
an active interest in one's mental well-being, a person may
render constructive meaning to his own life.

Thus, by

emphasizing personal action, as opposed to passivity or
conformity, existentialism stands out and reveals its
unique identity.
According to some existential psychologists (May,
Angel, & Ellenberger, 1958), there is a distinct tendency
in our Western world, and in particular modern science, to
make man look more and more like a robot or virtually over
into the image of the machine.

This is viewed as a dangerous

dehumanizing process, as May (1969) points out that, "there
is real possibility that we may be helping the individual
adjust and be happy at the price of loss of his being"
(p. 7).

May contends that the emphasis in today's society

is to make the individual dependent as a social person, by
stressing the need for belongingness, rather than pointing
out to him his responsibilities toward himself as an
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individual.

William James once said that "science was made

for man rather than man for science" (May, 1969, p. 8).
Existentialists further assert that the disregard for
individualism seems to have increased during the course of
the Industrial Revolution (May et al., 1958; Tillich, 1944).
Kierkegaard, in particular, witnessed in despair the growth
of modern science and technology in the early 19th century.
Although he was one of the early critics of this new and
emerging industrialized society, Heidegger was really the
first to articulate a formal existential philosophy
embodied this despair (Blackham, 1952).

which

According to

Kierkegaard and Heidegger, man becomes overly dependent on
society by allowing himself to be defined by others
role-playing or conforming.

through

Man prefers the simple cer-

tainty of the world of things

because he wants to avoid the

uncertainty and finitude of his existence.
lets society take charge over his living

In so doing, he
which in turn

frees him from having to experience the pain of facing one's
responsibilities (Blackham, 1952).
The existentialists are saying that technology and
science in fact have actually helped the individual repress
his sense of being, of what it means to be human in the
world.

The result for the person is that this "has led his

image of himself and his experience and concept of himself
as a responsjble individual to become disintegrated" (May,
1969, p. 11).

Hence what is required is a kind of personal
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commitment on part of the person, which will make him less
dependent upon his immediate environment.

It is necessary

that he actively attempts to move away from this kind of
symbiotic condition

which, if allowed to grow, very well

can become neurotic in kind (Kierkegaard, 1954; May et al.,
1958; May, 1969).
Some scholars, existential and others, even hold that
modern man is actually in the process of losing awareness
of his own self (Fair, 1969; May et al., 1958).

With the

loss of self awareness, man is becoming less and less
capable of developing his unique potentialities.

The

general feeling of insecurity, therefore, is intensified.
A decreasing interest in literature, philosophy and the
arts is symptomatic of the deep-seated alienation in
modern man.

Man develops a subtle feeling about existence

which Heidegger calls dread or Angst (Heidegger, 1962).
This dread or anxiety is essential to the human being

in

that it reveals to the person that he is "cast into the
world in order to die here" (Blackham, 1952, p. 96).
There is an increasing emphasis on extrinsic rewards,
which are elements "devoid of intrinsic or significant
value" (Marcel, 1949, p. 1).

Thus, contemporary man can

be characterized as being lethargic, apathetic, and
unreflectively sinking back into the immediate world of
pleasures (Fair, 1969; Marcel, 1949).

He will get further
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and further away from his own self, or even potentially out
of contact with this inner authenticity that should define
and denote his existence.
It is no wonder then, as May et al. (1958) point out,
that "the existential thinkers as a whole take this loss of
consciousness as the centrally tragic problem of our day,
not at all to be limited to psychological context of
neurosis" (p. 29).

Fair (1969) terms this deterioratina

condition as "the dying self."

A similar observation is

made by Tillich, the existential theologian, who in his
celebrated work The Courage To Be (1952) defines sin as
the separation from the self.
The dramatic technological and scientific changes of
the Industrial Revolution in effect meant a kind of psychological hegemony over the masses.

Kierkegaard realized the

disastrous implications it would have on the individual.
He saw these same impersonal tendencies also within philosophy and the established church.

Thus, he spent most of

his life attacking Hegel's pan-rationalism and the ruling
Lutheran dogma of his country.

Basically his criticism

focused on the disregard for the individual's need to ask
himself the most fundamental and important questions of life.
These are ontological questions like, What is Being?, What
does it mean to be? etc., which all point to man's existence and the human situation

as

such.
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Such inquiry, Heidegger said (1962), comprises a very
healthy contemplation indeed, as it implies concern for
man's being-in-the-world, or Dasein as Heidegger has it.
The best concern or "Care" one can show for one's Dasein,
amidst all risks and uncertainties, is when the person
decides to meet death face-to-face

by attempting to accent

the fact that he is a mortal being (Blackham, 1952;
Heidegger, 1962).

Therefore, and above all, death is to

Heidegger a possibility, since it reveals existence as an
island in nothing or between two nothings (Blackham, 1952;
Heidegger, 1962).
possibility

It is important that death is seen as a

because the authentic human being is never

realized here and now; the individual Dasein is always
"becoming" or moving forward (Blackham, 1952; Breisach,
1962; Heidegger, 1962).
death not by suicide

Henceforth, a person "anticipates

but by living in the presence of

death as always immediately possible and as undermining
everything" (Blackham, 1952, p. 96).
The dread or anxiety that this realization entails
virtually throws man into a situation

in which he is

forced to make a decision as to what route to take.

The

individual has to make a choice, a very important choice
indeed, as on one hand it means "acceptance of death as the
supreme and normative possibility ... and to refuse to be
identified with the preoccupations in which I engage," but
rather "take them for what they are worth: -- nothing"
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(Blackham, 1952, pp. 96-97).

On the other hand, by lack of

courage, man may choose to continue to live under the
dictate of everyday monotony, preoccupied with small
projects and trivia, which actually is a retreat into
illusion (Blackham, 1952).

The former choice goes beneath

nothingness and, in its total acceptance of death, constitutes a healthy prerequisite for authentic being
(Heidegger, 1962).
We are our choices, Sartre (1956) said, meaning we
have the power constantly to transform ourselves

and

therefore become aware of our own truth as we translate it
in action (Kierkegaard, 1954; 1957).

With this emphasis on

the commitment of the individual, it is perhaps not difficult to understand Sartre's famous axiom that "existence
precedes essence," that is, each man creates his essence
as he lives (Sartre, 1956).
With the above outline and explanation of some of the
most important concepts of existential philosophy, the
reader should be well equipped to follow the development
of the idea of death

as it moves from philosophy to con-

temporary existential psychology.

In so doing, the present

author hopes to tie a few strings together, something which
he feels has been long overdue in modern, scientific psychology.

8
SOren Kierkegaard
Although one may consider the dialogues of Socrates
and the thoughts of Pascal as proofs of existential themes,
contemporary scholars generally regard Kierkegaard and his
vigorous attacks on the rationalistic tendencies of his day
as the actual onset of what has come to be known as the
existential movement (Binswanger, 1963; Kaufmann, 1950; May
et al., 1958; Tillich, 1944, 1952).

This is due in part to

the sudden technological advancements, as well as Hegel's
attempt to interpret all reality in terms of a system of
essences

as opposed to concrete entities.

Kierkegaard was

naturally strongly critical of this Hegelian tendency

to

identify abstract truth with reality, as he declared that
pure speculative thought cannot define man's existence
(Kierkegaard, 1941).
According to Kierkegaard, with the industrial revolution the human values and ideals slowly disintegrated; and
the psychological life of the individual was, therefore,
characterized by denial and repression of the emotions.
And it is this psychological disunity which became the
predisposition for the emergence of anxiety.

Hence, it is

not surprising, as May (1950) Points out, "that in the
middle of that period, we should find Kierkegaard producing
the most direct and, in some ways the most profound study
of anxiety to appear up to that point in history" (may,
1950, p. 29).

Kierkegaard, as well as Nietzsche, denoted

9
that the panacea to this compartmentalization would have to
consider man as "the whole individual, as a feeling and
acting as well as thinking organism" (May, 1950, p. 30).

In

no other way, the existential thinkers insisted, could the
human being avoid the complete deterioration of the self.
Kierkegaard held that the so called irrational aspects
of experience cannot and should not be dispensed with; thus
thinking and passion are in this rer!ard inseparable.

For

this reason, it may be understandable why Kierkegaard
rejected strict definitions of such terms as "self" and
"truth."

He advocated instead a dynamic and dialectic way

of defining, which as Tillich states is more than a mere
subjective approach

since it entails "that living experi-

ence in which both subjectivity and objectivity are rooted"
(Tillich, 1944, p. 67).
What Kierkegaard cared for more than anything else was
the spiritual health of the individual.

There are two works

by the Danish existentialist that exclusively deal with the
various dispositions of individual self, and these are The
Concept of Dread (1957) and The Sickness Unto Death (1954).
These works will be analyzed in the context of Kierkegaard's
view of death in man's personal development and also to
make clear what he means by such concepts as self, spirit,
and dread.

So far, they have merely been stressed tangen-

tially since the objective was more to delineate the rationale behind Kierkegaard's endeavor.
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While Nietzsche is characterized by a psychological
breadth, Kierkegaard is recognized for his psychological
depth (Kaufmann, 1956).

In the works mentioned above,

Kierkegaard makes a thorough analysis of his own self and
almost exclusively concentrates on different kinds of
despair or anxiety and how to deal with these states of
mind.

"Dread," he states, "is freedom's reality as possi-

bility for possibility" (Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 38), which
to him is the same thing as saying that whenever there is
a possibility for an individual to move on or potentially
grow, there inevitably is anxiety present as well.

The

anxiety in this case is not of a neurotic kind, which is
constrictive and uncreative, but rather of a normal quality
which serves as a catalyst to further growth (May, 1950;
May et al., 1958).
One key to understand Kierkegaard's thoughts lies in
his interpretation of the myth of Adam and Eve, i.e. the
original sin.

Althought his purpose for employing this

myth primarily is a theological one, his approach is neverthe less of enormous psychological significance.

(The two

works mentioned, incidentally, are the only books expressly
described as psychological by Kierkeaaard himself.)
Thus, in The Concept of Dread (1957), the author
develops the idea of what the human self may be as a living
spirit.

As Genesis relates it, Adam and Eve were, prior to

the Fall, both "naked," as they had not yet eaten the
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fruits from the tree of good and evil.

But at this point,

of course, they had no knowledge of the tree of good and
evil; therefore, as Kierkegaard says, "Innocence is ignorance" (1957, p. 37).

As soon as God's prohibition is

sounded however, Adam is overwhelmed by a vague, vacuous
and profound feeling of anxiety
to call Dread.

which Kierkegaard prefers

It describes the condition perfectly

of the dialectic ambiguity involved.

because

Thus, in the author's

words, "Dread is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic
sympathy" (Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 38).

It is important to

note here that Kierkegaard is not referring to fear, which
is being afraid of something in particular--like a snake, but
rather to something unexplainable, that is--Nothing, to
speak with Heidegger's tongue (Heidegger, 1962; Kierkegaard,
1957).

Therefore, Adam is beginning to become aware of

something, but in his ignorance he does not know of what,
and so he experiences Dread.

Kierkegaard states hence that

"This is the profound secret of innocence that at the same
time it is dread" (1957, p. 38).
Kierkegaard finds, ironically, use for Hegel's dialectic
method at this stage, but of course for quite different
purposes, since he aims at logically explaining the development of the self, or man's potential freedom in becoming an
individual.

Before the Fall then, man is yet without

individuality, as his body and mind, in "peace and repose,"

12
lie dormantly entangled with one another (Kierkegaard,
1957).

However, the first move toward self-consciousness

has already taken place, at the occurrence of dread, which
"is a qualification of the dreaming spirit, and, as such,
it has its place in psychology" (Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 38).
The spirit then consists of a body-mind synthesis, a combination which Kierkegaard says is still only potentially
in existence.

This state of spirit also comprises the

highest level of potential individuality--something that
Kierkegaard labels "pure awareness" (Kierkegaard, 1957).
Next

follows the Fall, which the author states "psy-

chology is unable to explain, for it is the qualitative
leap" (Kierkegaard, 1957, p. 43).

Most likely, the author

is referring to the individuality of the act

because it

cannot be experienced in any other way since it stands out
as a subtle and introvert transition and, therefore, out of
reach for objective science.

At any rate, the Fall connotes

the birth of consciousness, as man receives knowledge of
good and evil, which in turn causes the separation of the
spiritual synthesis, i.e. body and mind.

The consequence

is that

no longer is this relationship in repose and

harmony

but rather a denotion of a differential dialectic.

Man becomes aware of himself, not because he is tempted,
says Kierkegaard, but because he dreads (1957).

However,

if dread drove him to obtain knowledge, then dread very
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much turns out to be the consequence

as man becomes con-

scious of his own mortality and difference in sex.
The role of the spirit, Kierkegaard says, is to achieve
in actuality what was earlier in potentiality, namely pure
awareness.

It is important here to see what Kierkegaard

really means by spirit.

In the first paragraph of his

Sickness Unto Death, he thus states that "Man is spirit.
But what is spirit?
self?

Spirit is the self.

But what is the

The self is a relation which relates itself to its

own self" (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 146).

The relation of

course refers to the union of body and mind, where the body
knows of the mind and vice versa.

However, he states that

the relation actually is the self relating itself to its
own self.

In order to make this possible, one would need

completely to detach one's self from body and mind.

This

individual detachment can lead toward a fulfillment of the
self or pure awareness (Blackham, 1952; Kierkegaard, 1957).
In turn, it is the most important task of the spirit and can
only come about by moving through dread, which therefore
first needs to be overcome.

In other words, dread is the

result of the spirit's knowledge of body and mind.

Dread

can be overcome by closing out the busy, everyday world and
by absorbing the true sense of one's reality.

Kierkegaard's

Sickness Unto Death, consequently, presents us with the
following motto:

"Lord give us weakened eyes for things
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that are no good and eyes full of clarity for all they
truth" (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 141).
If the above motto is not followed, that is, if man
does not act upon his dread, he will most certainly find
himself in a state of transposition of life and death.
Kierkegaard calls this condition the sickness unto death,
the very terror of which is that one cannot die, although one
would want to.

One is brought to the threshold of death

but not over it because one has to Q0 on living the life
of choice (Kierkegaard, 1954; May, 1950; Wahl, 1969).
Therefore, the heart of the problem exists in man's relation
to himself, since only he can choose to rid himself of the
nonsense of petty preoccupations.

Hence, Kierkegaard would

probably concur with Nietzsche that in order to become an
individual one should "read only your life and understand
from it the hieroglyphics of universal life" (Kaufmann,
1950, P- 135).
The crucial point of Kierkegaard is how man can will to
be himself.

He may choose to be himself, but only in a

defiant fashion, or he may be willing to be someone else,
by actually submitting himself to an idol and worshipping
that idol.

Willing, according to Yierkegaard, is a creative

decisiveness, based centrally on self-consciousness.

The

more conscious, he says, the more self the individual will
realize (Kierkegaard, 1954).

By producing will-power, then,

one can move through the anxiety of the situation and thus
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develop one's potentialities in light of the possibilities
present at a particular time.

If the person refuses, this

will clearly lead to severe guilt and self-defeating conflicts, whereupon neurotic or, worse even, psychotic anxiety
may develop, which can promise nothing but impotence for the
individual (Kierkegaard, 1954; May, 1950).
Despite Kierkegaard's vehement assaults upon the
Established Church and the Hegelian System, he remained
completely unknown throughout the 19th century.

Neverthe-

less, in his antagonism toward Hegel, he was later joined
by a number of scholars, of whom Nietzsche, by far, was the
most dynamic.

Nietzsche feared that the inevitable result

of the growing emphasis on the technical aspects of reason
would probably be nihilism (Kaufmann, 1950).

The tradi-

tional rationalism, he predicted, would transform everything, "including man himself, into an object of calculation
and control" (Tillich, 1944, p. 66).

In an assessment of

this historical period, Tillich refers to this dehumanizing
process as a result of what he calls "technical reason,"
the implicationsof which "have become increasingly clear:
a logical or naturalistic mechanism which seemed to destroy
individual freedom, personal decision, and organic community" (Tillich, 1944, p. 66).
May (1950) points out that all segments of society,
therefore, seemed to have been marked by a cultural "compartmentalization" (p. 28), a fragmentary and alienating

.16
process.

Hence, for instance, it may not be surprising to

find Ibsen attacking just that in his classic play The Doll's
House (1909), where family life appears stagnant and unreal.
Even the early Marx, with whom Kierkegaard possibly had a
few encounters, showed great sympathy with the anti-rational
tendencies, as he strongly criticized the Industrial Revolution for its depersonalization of the masses (May et al.,
1958; Tillich, 1944).

Thus, these various existential voices

relied to a large degree on the emergence of industrialism
which, as has been seen, permeated and affected all sections
of society.

However, the influence of these thinkers was

not felt or fully recognized until the occurrence of World
War I, over half a century past the death of Kierkegaard
(May et al., 1958; Tillich, 1944).
There are similarities between the insights of
Kierkegaard and those of more contem,Dorary psychologists.
Thus, Otto Rank and C. G. Jung speak of the realization of
one's potentialities or unique existence as "individuation"
(Progoff, 1969).

This, they say, may be gained "at the price

of confronting the anxiety inherent in taking a stand
against as well as with one's environment" (May, 1950,
p. 34).

In a similar vein, Kierkegaard speaks of his

emerging awakeness

as "the alarming possibility of being

able" (1957, p. 40).

Thus, it is clear that self-hood

cannot be achieved unless the individual moves ahead despite
the confronted anxiety.

17
Martin Heidegger
The task is now to relate what previously has been said
about Kierkegaard

to the German existential philosopher

Heidegger, who eventually came to play an important role in
the formation of existential psychoanalysis, i.e. the psychology of Ludwig Binswanger (1963).

Although Heidegger

prefers not to be called an existentialist, it is nonetheless clear that the essence of his writings, i.e. Being and
Time (1962), is very existential indeed (Kaufmann, 1956).
This will become clearer as we penetrate into his thought
and as the Kierkegaardian influence is brought to the
surface.
Blackham (1952) denotes that Heidegger's primary
ambition seems to have been the continuous search for the
"original roots of all possible knowledge" (p. 87), a
project which in effect meant a realization of a fundamental
ontology

or theory of Being.

As a result, he departed

sharply from traditional Western philosophy

which

to a large degree had been outlined and formulated by Hegel
(Blackham, 1952; Kaufmann, 1956).

In so doing, Heidegger

preferred to think of himself as a scholar of a more technical and systematic type.

However, his ontological study

aims at showing us the necessary steps to take in order to
become an existing human being.

In other words, although

Heidegger does not take the passionate and subjective route
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of Kierkegaard, his debt and similarity to Kierkegaard is,
in many ways, quite obvious.
Due to the intricacy and abstruseness of Heidegger's
thought, no attempt will be made in this presentation to
relate and analyze the man in his philosophical totality.
The intention, rather, is to give a concise

but thorough

exposure of those concepts and ideas that the present author
believes to be the most relevant ones

in light of the theme

of the thesis.
Initially, however, a brief recollection of what has
to this point is deemed to he appropriate.

been said up

It

is recalled, then, that the emerging problem of interest
settled around the concept of death, or rather the dread or
anxiety thereof, and the relation of this to a person's
individual development.

An attempt was undertaken to point

out how and why man comes to experience lethargy and meaninglessness in his life.

Later, with reference to Kierkegaard

and others, it was found that there exists basically two
courses of action for the individual to take, provided he
first realizes and experiences the dread of this kind of
situation.

He may either simply acquiesce or give in to a

continuously dependent

but vacuous sort of living

or he

may choose to see himself as a potentially unique and free
human being.

Hence, one can speak of a passive versus an

active path, of which the latter signifies the only route
toward constructive self-development.

In order to realize
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one's true individual self, however, one necessarily must
face and move through the profound dread experienced.
Dread, therefore, always seems to be oriented toward something that has not yet occurred and, hence, it also could be
spoken of as a possibility.

Moreover, this essential role

of dread in the thought of Kierkegaard is one important
factor that brings existentialism away from the rationalistic philosophy of Hegel.

Nothing in the existential

approach could perhaps be deemed more existential than this
ambivalent leap into consciousness.

By moving on to

Heidegger, it should be possible to discover his proximity
to the above theme and, hence, the continuation of the so
called "Kierkegaardian rhythm," i.e. going from "the
extremity of dread to the thought of beatitude" (Wahl, 1969,
p. 115).
In the philosophy of Heidegger, the concept of dread
or anxiety is of outstanding significance.

He is said to

have called it the most important of human emotions
(Blackham, 1952; Wahl, 1969), which in turn points at death,
the source and center of the Heideggerian ontology
(Blackham, 1952; Langan, 1961; Wahl, 1969).

The phenomenon

of death, therefore, is especially well suited to serve as a
guide through the labyrinth of his thought.

Anybody attempt-

ing to understand or at least familiarizing himself with the
major work of the German philosopher, i.e. Being and Time
(1962), cannot fail to notice the centrality of death.
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Already at this stage one should be able to notice the
influence of Kierkegaard, to whom, of course, death was of
utmost significance in his inquiry into human existence.
Heidegger, thus, saw death, not unlike Kierkegaard, as a
possibility or prospect through which a person, on account
of his own power to realize his own finitude, may render
The

particular meaning to his present moment of existence.
mode of existence of the human being is roughly what

Heidegger calls Dasein, and it is this that I as an individual have to try to get the most out of
to realize my individuality.

in order to be able

The implication of this is

that human existence is not something given, but rather a
possibility that only can be experienced when the person
actually decides to take charge over his own existence
(Heidegger, 1962).
From the above analysis, it should be possible to
derive two dimensions or relations of Dasein that are separate yet necessarily interrelated.

The first phase com-

prises the connection between the person or being and other
beings.

Hence, it is an environmental bond

says cannot be disregarded or taken lightly

which Heidegger
as it connotes

an indispensable social interdependence of everyday experience.

This nature of Dasein, or "being-in-common," is

primordial to the concept and also reveals the solicitude
for other persons (Blackham, 1952; Heidegger, 1962).

How-

ever, too much dependence inevitably leads to an escape
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from personal responsibility.

Complete submission or adjust-

ment to the established everydayness of life can only impair
the person's potential self-growth.

The individual may not

realize that his "17 remains buried in the one" (Blackham,
1952, p. 91), because with his own acquiescence he virtually
reinforces this general form of existence (Heidegger, 1962).
A person may never come to realize the many fruitful actions
that the Dasein has in store for him, unless he becomes
aware of the meaninglessness and dehumanization of the
established routine.

This impersonal "ubiquitous dictator

of everyday human affairs" (Blackham, 1952, p. 91),
Heidegger calls "they" (das Man) (1962).
Closely linked to the "they" concept is the idea of
death, which Heidegger considers of utmost importance, as
it plays a key role in the individual Dasein.

In the "they"

dimension, or the pragmatic world of objects and obstacles,
"death is 'known' as a mishap, which is constantly occurring
- as a 'case of death'" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 296).

Further-

more, Heidegger points out how we escape even talking about
death or dying, as we pass it off as something "not yet
present-at-hand," and therefore surmising it does not constitute a threat (Heidegger, 1962, p. 297).

Thus, there is

a certain pull toward the "they" world, or as Heidegger says
"a temptation to cover up from oneself one's ownmost Beingtowards-death," which in turn reveals the amazing power of
"the tranquilized everydayness" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 297) of
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the "they' world.

By shrugging off the thought of death as

an objective and distant event, "they has already decided
what state-of-mind is to determine our attitude towards
death" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 298).

In this sense, we seem to

display a cowardly fear or "a sign of insecurity on the part
of the Dasein, and a sombre way of fleeing from the world"
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 298).

Heidegaer states that it is

exactly this kind of indifference that "alienates Dasein
from its ownmost non-relational potentiality-for-Being"
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 298).

Thus, the second and more pro-

found dimension of the Dasein concerns itself with the
Being, to which Heidegger says we must turn our attention if
we are to approach the highest state of authenticity
(Heidegger, 1962; Wahl, 1969).

But what actually does

Heidegger mean by the term Being?
nection to authenticity?

Also, what is its con-

A clarification of this would

surely enhance the understanding of his philosophy as a
whole.
The basis for Heidegger's philosophy is the differentiation between Being and particular beings.

Traditional

metaphysics, he thought, had confused the term being or any
particular object, such as man or tree, with Being
common ground of beings (Demske, 1970).

or the

In Heidegger's own

image, "the truth of Being may thus be called the ground in
which metaphysics, as the root of the tree of philosophy, is
kept and from which it is nourished" (Heidegger, 1962,
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p. 296).

Consequently, authenticity or the truth of Being

can only be found in that which all the aspects (beings) are
grounded and have in common, i.e. the Being itself (Heidegger,
1962; Wahl, 1969).

Therefore, it is impoEsible to describe

and define Being, since it is concealed and goes beyond or
transcends all particular objects in time and space (1969).
What separates man from other beings is that he has the
opportunity to relate himself as a human being, "to what it
intrinsically means to be" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 298).

Thus,

when man contemplates and realizes his connection to Being,
then, according to Heidegger, he is on the way to open up
the authentic phase of his Dasein (Demske, 1970; Heidegger,
1962; Wahl, 1969).
In order to understand the polarity of the Dasein,
Heidegger makes reference to anxiety, which, like the
Kierkegaardian concept of dread, plays an essential role in
man.

It serves the same purpose of allowing us to distin-

guish between the authentic and unauthentic (Wahl, 1969).
Hence, there is a situation of choice that enters into the
individual's life

as he realizes that he is more than just

a being in the everyday routine world.

For the first time

he sees himself in a world of possibility and freedom, which,
because it offers the opportunity to create his own values
to live by, also brings a feeling of tremendous anxiety of
death (Heidegger, 1962).

Overwhelmed by his own finitude or
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the certainty that death could strike at any moment, "evasiveness in the face of death" is no longer possible
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 299).
Upon the unfolding of this existential truth, the
person for the first time in his life realizes his potential
individuality in the sense that he feels "cast-into-theworld" (Blackham, 1952; Heidegger, 1962).

The same phenom-

enon Heidegger calls throwness or an experience that denotes
to the individual the uniqueness of his own situation
thus defines his Dasein (Heidegger, 1962)

and

Perhaps in the

words of Pascal this existential problem is most appropriately put:

"When I consider the brief span of my life,

swallowed up in the eternity before and behind it, the small
space that I fill, or even see, engulfed in the infinite
immensity of spaces which I know not, and which know not me,
I am afraid, and wonder to see myself here rather than there,
now rather than then...." (Pascal, 1946, p. 36).

This

anxious feeling of the world as a whole, at this particular
point in time (Befindlichkeit), simultaneously reveals a
future full of possibilities.

Hence, to the individual it

is a condition of becoming, which tells him that whatever he
will become it is his own doing, as he from now on is in
personal charge over his destiny (May et al., 1958).

A

person's life may not change in shape unless he takes an
interest and does something about it.

The determination to

take a constructive approach to one's life is thus of key
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importance to Heidegger and other existentialists.

This

same process Heidegger came to label Care (Sorge), since
without proper personal concern we could never hope to bring
about constructive and healthy change in ourselves
(Heidegger, 1962; Langan, 1961).
Pascal's experience of being cast-into-the-world also
seems to link the feeling of anxiety or dread to what
Heidegger called nothingness (1962), a vague and trembling
intuition on part of the individual that his "personal
existence is launched between nothingness and nothingness
and it is nothingness that is real" (Blackham, 1952, p. 96)
He seems to have come to the conclusion that he has been
arbitrarily thrown into existence, out of "the infinite
immensity of spaces" (Pascal, 1946), and upon his death
again become "one" with this "no-thing-ness" (Spiceland,
1971).

Perhaps Heidegger is trying to tell us that upon

the realization of our own finitude we simultaneously see
ourselves as infinitesmal or like a flash of lightning projected on the eternal black screen.
In Heidegger, as in Kierkegaard, it is clear then that
anxiety (dread) is our reaction to death or the reality
thereof.

But as Wahl (1969) stated, "it cannot be said

that Heidegger and Kierkegaard wish to leave us in dread,"
for it is "by way of dread of death that we can approach the
highest state of authenticity ... a kind of serenity" (Wahl,
1969, P. 117).

Hence, in the face of death we must move on

26
in spite of the dread of the situation
make the most out of our existence.

and enthusiastically

However, in order to

break with the status quo of a society, one must have courage
or, as Jung once phrased it:

"Everything good is costly,

and the development of the personality is one of the most
costly of all things" (Kopp, 1972, p. 6).
Heidegger's philosophy, no matter how metaphysical in
aim, nonetheless turns out to be quite personal after all.
In the final analysis, this is probably what he wished it
to be, althought his primary objective always was to revise
the existing Western philosophical tradition.

Like

Kierkegaard, he seemed to want to remind us that while
completely wrapped up in rational everyday behavior, we
forget what it means to be, to exist as human beings,
complete with senses and all.

In truth, of course, our

Danish friend has much more emotional insight to offer, while
Heidegger basically is a systematic philosopher--not overtly
interested in the everyday mental health of the human being.
It appears, therefore, that Kierkegaard has much more to
tell us about the depths of anxiety (vide Concept of Dread)
and thus reveals more proximity to psychology than Heidegger.
However, the influence of these two pioneerina existential
thinkers becomes clear with the emergence of Otto Rank and
Ludwig Binswanger.

These two psychoanalysts, who initially

were associated with Freud, have established a reputation of
great significance within existential psychotherapy and psychology.
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Otto Rank
Up to this point, the thesis has settled around
thinkers that clearly have been identified with the existential movement.

At the outset it was emphasized that

their thoughts, particularly in relation to the idea of
death, together would facilitate the later analysis of the
case of Ellen West.

Hence, it is within this understanding

that the psychology of Otto Rank now is being brought forth.
The present author believes, therefore, that not only will
the case just referred to become illuminated

but the

inclusion of Rank will also enable the reader to discover
his proximity to, in particular, Kierkegaard.

In this

sense, the definite existential theme in Rank's thought can
more clearly be seen.

Several scholars have suggested that

had Rank not met such an untimely and early death he would
probably have turned out to be an important voice in existential psychology (Becker, 1973; Langman, 1961; May et al.,
1958).
Rank was together with Jung and Adler one of Freud's
few major "disciples."

While, in contrast to the others, he

had no medical background, he instead obtained an extensive
training in the humanities.

He is known to have been

greatly interested in such notable thinkers as Kierkegaard,
Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer (Langman, 1961; Nagler, 1974).
Hence, it was in this context that Rank first developed his
special interest for the artist, something that he was to
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maintain throughout his short lifespan.

Due to his long

affiliation with Freud, he did not seem able to devote himself freely to the role of the artist

until he had been

ostracized from Freud's inner circle.

However, the sepa-

ration was an uncomfortable one for Rank; and the remainder
of his life, during which he became very creative on his
own, is therefore seen as that of isolation, anxiety, and
introspection (Karpf, 1970; Progoff, 1969).
The Concept of The Birth Trauma
With the publication of The Birth Trauma (1929) Rank
made his first documentation of his deviant views.

Although

this birth trauma formulation was not completely unfamiliar
to Freudian thought (Karpf, 1970), members of the psychoanalytic school called it "a scientific regression which
closely resembled that of Jung and Adler" (Wilson, 1972,
pp. 100-101).

Ironically, it had not been Rank's intention

to defy the established psychoanalytic doctrine but, on the
contrary, to present his ideas in the best spirit of his
master.

The controversy that followed nevertheless forced

an unwilling break between Freud and Rank (Karpf, 1970).
However, Rank's newly gained independence meant that he was
now at liberty to express his own unique ideas.
Initially, his opinions basically centered around
birth, or the separation from the womb, which he at the time
of the break with Freud viewed to be the most important fact
of human existence (Progoff, 1969; Rank, 1929).

The great
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shock that birth in effect constitutes, Rank says, "proves
anxiety to be the nucleus of every neurotic disturbance"
(1929, p. 46).

The main point of his argument, however,

does not rest with the affect of anxiety per se, but rather
that "the whole neurosis formation point quite definitely to
reproduced reminiscences of birth or the pleasurable stage
precedina it" (Rank, 1929, p. 46).

It is evident in the

above quote that Rank still very much adhered to traditional
Freudian interpretations, while his own unique ideas are
only implicitly visible at this stage of his thinking.
7

Thus, as Langman (1961) points out, Rank most certainly
intended to view the birth trauma as something more than
mere psycho-physical reality.

It is of great interest,

therefore, to see how he later on, still in the same work
(1929), incorporates the idea of the original sin into the
context of the birth trauma.

By so doing, he becomes

somewhat elusive in terms of his own position in this regard.
His elusiveness is perhaps understandable in light of the
conflict that had emeraed between his humanistic background
and his Freudian upbrinaing.
It is interesting to notice Rank's nearness to
Kierkegaard

as he states that "the death punishment decreed

for the breaking of this command (not to eat of the fruit)
clearly shows that the woman's offence consists in the
breaking off of the fruit, namely giving birth, and here
again in the meaning of the tendency to return to death
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proves to be a wishreaction to the birth trauma" (Rank,
1929, pp. 113-114).

Hence birth seems to be the symbolical

picture of man's estrangement from a paradisaical state of
tranquillity or existential Being.

Thus, in order to over-

come the trauma or anxiety involved in man's existence, one
must move ahead and, during the course of one's life time,
attempt to restore the lost Paradise.
cisely this

Rank depicts pre-

when he states that "the Ego in its retreat

from the confines of anxiety is constantly urged forward to
seek for Paradise in the world formed in the image of the
mother, instead of seeking it in the past, and, in so far
as this fails, to look for it in the sublime wish compensations of religion, art, and philosophy" (Rank, 1929,
p. 190).
Quite clearly, one discovers in the above quote a
familiar theme from Kierkegaard and Heidegger.

They

repeatedly stressed that the only way man may be able to
overcome his existential crisis is for him to move forward,
despite the confronted anxiety.

Moreover, this theme seems

to coincide with the basic notion of existentialism as a
whole.

According to Wilson (1972) the existential manifesto

states that "man is not naturally static; his mental energy,
like his blood, was intended to be kept moving.

His mental

being must be understood as something essentially dynamic,
forward-flowing, like a river.

All mental illness is the

outcome of damming the river" (p. 206).

No doubt, this
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basic idea in existentialism to move ahead, in spite of the
troubles, becomes even more conspicuous at a later stage in
Rank's career.

This is particularly true in his psychology

of neurosis.
The Artist and Creativity
There is one type of human being, according to Rank
(1932), who perhaps more than anybody has the ability to
successfully develop his potentials.

He is the one, Rank

says, who "the history of mind has handed down to us as the
hero, and which we would like to designate as 'artist' in
the broadest sense of the word, in so far as it is a question
of a creation of ideal values" (Rank, 1929, p. 190).

The

interest and sympathy with which Rank approached the hardships of the artist's life reveals, as Progoff (1969) puts
it, "that Rank saw himself reflected in the kind of individual he called the 'artist type'," and that he had "a
strong urge to creative activity in his own personality"
(p. 189).

It is no small wonder then that Rank so firmly

refuted Freud's quite negative view of creativity as some
sort of neurotic compensatory mechanism.
The artist, as Rank sees him, is the type of person "who
no longer accepts the collective solution to the problem of
existence" (Becker, 1973, p. 171).

On the contrary, he is

the creative type who realizes that he himself must fashion
his own picture of existence.

And because the artist, better
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than anybody else, understands his plight of estrangement,
"he takes refuge, from the life of actuality, which for him
spells mortality and decay" (Rank, 1932, p. 38).

The

artist, therefore, tends to be the opposite to what Rank
called "the average well-adjusted man" (1932, p. 251), who,
as Becker (1973) puts it, "bites off what he can chew and
digest of life and no more" (p. 178).

Consequently, the

artist is "the creative searcher after truth" (Rank, 1945,
p. 251), who seeks individualization in a non-constrictive
world-design.

In so doino, he "lifts his nose from the

ground and starts sniffing at eternal problems like life
and death" (Becker, 1973, p. 178).
That which sets Rank's psychology of neurosis most
clearly apart from orthodox psychoanalysis is his assessment
of the neurotic individual.

Like the creative type, the

neurotic is "at the point of seeing through the deception
of the world of sense, the falsity of reality," but "as
distinguished from the creative man of will ... is not the
voluntary happy seeker of truth, but the forced unhappy
finder of it" (Rank, 1945, p. 251).

Judging from the above,

it would appear as if Rank expresses a subtle scorn or contempt toward the "average" or "well-adjusted," something
like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche often did (Becker, 1973;
Langman, 1961).

Not surprisingly, therefore, one finds

Rank (1945) acknowledging that "If man is the more normal,
healthy and happy, the more he can accept the appearance
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of reality as truth, that is, the more successfully he can
repress, displace, deny, rationalize, dramatize himself,
and deceive others" (pp. 250-251).
If Rank (1932) maintains a sympathetic outlook toward
the neurotic, it is because he sees him as an individual
with artistic potentials but unable to create, as he "stops
at the point where he includes the world within himself"
(p. 377).

Thus, in contrast to the artist, the neurotic

allows his introverted world to become an oppression
instead of an expression.

The artist is also an introvert,

with a "major feeling of the world," but he can "use this
introverted world not only as a protection but as a material" (Rank, 1932, p. 377).

According to Rank (1945) then,

the neurotic, despite his profound and self-defeative
anxiety, "nevertheless corresponds much more to a miscarried artist (artiste manqu'e), than to an average man
who has not achieved normal development" (p. 160).
Hence, the artist seems to be able to work out his
potentially schizophrenic fantasies by way of objective
production.

In turn, his creativity saves him from getting

caught in the vicious circle of the world of the neurotic.
The question still remains, however, what is the motivation or energy underlying the creative artist's aspirations for individuality?

In Rank's later works, i.e. Art

and Artist (1932), Psychology and the Soul (1961), and
Beyond Psychology (1941), the concern is predominantly
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focused on what lies "beyond psychology," which to Rank
meant "going beyond individuality that provides the background of the individual personality" (Progoff, 1969,
p. 229).

Moreover, these later writings constitute a

growth and maturity in Rank's thought

which in turn is a

clarification and development of his idea of the birth
trauma.
The Will to Immortality
If there is one aspect of Rank's psychology that has
come to stand out and, thereby, given Rank his present
status, it probably is his concept of the will.

Hence,

Progoff (1969) states that, "Rank's insight into the nature
of the will is the key to all his work, therapeutical and
theoretical" (p. 201).

At the time of his negation of

Freud's work, Rank (1945), out of sheer defiance, simply
viewed the will as a manifestation of consciousness.

But

as his independence and intellectual maturity grew, Rank
(1941) saw consciousness, rather, as a "barrier to the free
expression of the life-will of the individual" (p. 277-278).
Although in this broader context, Rank (1941) did not speak
of the unconscious as such, he defined the will in terms of
"the irrational forces" of the psyche, or as "an autonomous
organizing force in the individual which ... constitutes the
creative expression of the total personality and distinguishes one individual from another" (p. 50).

Accordingly,

the will is the force with which a human being asserts his
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potentials.

Therefore, in order for the individual to

realize his unique existence

it is necessary that he does

not shun away from active participation in life.

Rank

points out that the will, or the inner principle of the
psyche, remains dormant and passive

unless it is excited

in situations of conflict or tension.
ThuH, the power or the expression of the will is able
to enhance or encourage individual existence.

But since

existence sooner or later must come to an end, the underlying question still remains

as to what the real purpose

may be, if in death it is destroyed.

At this time, there-

fore, Rank more explicitly expounds on his view of death.
While so doing, it seems as if he also adds new meaning to
his concept of the birth trauma.
Throughout history, Rank (1961) says, man has interpreted and reinterpreted death in light of his conception
of the universe.

What brought on this ceaseless inquiry,

Rank (1961) reiterates, was man's "dawning sense of death"
(p. 34).

As the individual realizes that at some futural

moment his life must be terminated, it becomes absolutely
necessary for him to develop a clear notion of the will's
continuous existence.

In this context, therefore, man's

most basic striving is revealed, namely, his urge or longing
for immortality (Rank, 1932; 1961).
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Based on what so far has been said about the creative,
artistic type, and his particular aspirations, it would,
thus, follow logically that he is the one who is most
anxious to immortalize himself.

Consequently, Rank (1932)

states, "Only through the will-to-self-immortalization,
which rises from the fear of life, can we understand the
interdependence of production and suffering and the definite
influence of this on positive experience" (p. 43).

What is

important in this last statement is not only that "In
creation the artist tries to immortalize his mortal life"
(Rank, 1932, p. 39), but equally that "there is in the
individual a primal fear, which manifests itself now as a
fear of life, another time as fear of death" (Rank, 1945,
p. 123).

Hence, to the artist this is clearly detected, as

his "creative impulse ... attempts to turn ephemeral life
into personal immortality" (Rank, 1932, p. 39).

Everyday

monotony, thus, is transient and spells death and decay to
the possessor of creative impulse, which Rank (1932), moreover, sees as "the life impulse made to serve the individual
will" (p. 39).
But since "the individual is thrown back and forth all
his life" (Rank, 1945, p. 124) between these poles of fear,
the artist creates out of fear of death as well.

Rank

(1932) points out that, in itself, the act of creation constitutes immortalization of mortal life, but afterwards "the
created work does not go on living; it is, in a sense, dead,
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both ... spiritually and psychologically, in that it no
longer has any significance for its creator, once he has
produced it" (p. 39).

Thus, the individual's will demands

that "he again takes refuge in life and again forms experiences" (Rank, 1932, P. 39).
However, it appears as if the double fears, in fact,
are one and the same, since, as has been seen, the artist
can be either repelled from or attracted to the same
stimulus source.

And it is precisely in this dimension that

Rank (1941) introduces his idea of Third Principle, which in
effect is an integration of instinct psychology and that of
consciousness.

He, therefore, viewed "human behavior as

extending beyond individual psychology to a broader conception

a third principle, which combines the rational

and irrational elements in a world view based on the conception of the supernatural" (Rank, 1941, p. 62).
Hence, it is by going beyond his own individuality that
the artist, inspired by his will, seeks to gain immortality.
The artist transcends his personal

as well as his social

or collective experiences, whereby he creates an immortalized self-will (Rank, 1932; 1961).

Specifically, then,

the artist seeks to make himself eternal

in a battle against

"complete absorption of the ego in the collective or of the
individual in the genus" (Rank, 1932, p. 36b).
In conclusion then, it needs to be emphasized that what
Rank in essence had accomplished with his theory of
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will-to-immortality was, first of all, an extension of his
original birth-trauma theory.

Man's foremost goal in life

is to overcome his anxiety of isolation, after having been
separated from the tranquil and dependable womb.

But since

Rank did not have in mind to view the birth-trauma on a
psycho-physical level, it would appear as if

later

notion of immortality, quite profitably, parallels the
existential concept of Being.

In fact, both Kierkegaard

and Heidegger discussed anxiety as a consequence of the
original sin or in terms of "throwness", that is, man's
sense of being cast-into-the-world (Heideager, 1962).
Moreover, Kierkegaard's "sickness-unto-death" (1954)
is exactly what Rank's neurotic artist is possessed with.
He is completely torn between the life and death fears or,
as Rank also put it, man's refusal to accept "the loan
(life) in order thus to escape the payment of the debt
(death)" (Rank, 1945, p. 126).
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Ludwig Binswanger
At this point the attention turns to Ludwig Binswanger
and his original existential approach to psychoanalysis.

In

so doing, the present author hopes to identify the various
currents of thought that were instrumental in the formation
of "the existential analysis school of thought" (Binswanger
in May et al., 1958, p. 191).

Although the philosophical

foundation of Binswanger's existential analysis was derived
from Heidegger's analysis of Being, the influence of Freud's
psychoanalysis and Husserl's phenomenoloay are equally of
great importance (Ellenberger in May et al., 1958).

In the

words of one contemporary existential analyst, "Binswanger
represents a synthesis of psychoanalysis, phenomenology,
and existential concepts modified by original new insights"
(Ellenberger, 1958, p. 120).
In this presentation of existential analysis we shall
start with the psychoanalytic role in Binswanger's approach,
since it was his participation in Freud's analytic circles
that promoted Binswanger to become more philosophically concerned.

The next step will be to examine the influences of

Heidegger and Husserl

so that we may more fully understand

the framework of existential analysis.

However, it is

believed that a complete picture of the Binswanaer point of
view may not be obtained

unless it can be exemplified and

elucidated by a case stud".

The latter part of this thesis

is, therefore, devoted to fulfill this particular objective,
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as Binswanger's analysis of the case of Ellen West is being
presented.

This classic case is particularly interesting

for the present thesis, since it deals with a woman torn
between life and death anxiety (Binswanger, 1958).
The inclusion of this particular case also provides
ideal ground for bringing together various existential
voices.

These tend to reveal a striking proximity to the

approach taken by Binswanger.

Of particular interest in

this context are the often profound insights offered to us
by thinkers like Kierkegaard, Rank, and Tillich, to name
a few.

In a sense, then, the case of Ellen West hopefully

comprises a conjuncture of everything that has been said
heretofore.
Binswanger and Freud
In contrast to the other innovators in the area of
psychoanalysis, Binswanger maintained a warm and respectful
relationship with Freud throughout the latter's life.
Although this bond by no means was free from disagreement,
it is important to bear in mind that Binswanger saw himself
and his existential analytic approach as a complement rather
than denial of psychoanalysis (Binswanger, 1963).

He saw

orthodox psychoanalysis as "an oversimplification and constriction of human reality" (Wilson, 1972, n. 19).

He

argued that there was more to be found in the nature of
man than what Freud had led us to believe (Wilson, 1972).
One time, in particular, at a significant meetina between
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the two, Binswanger (1963) expounded on the essence of human
existence, whereby he revealed his conviction that there
are in man certain potential qualities which together may
be termed "spirit" (Binswanger, 1957, p. 81).

In response,

Freud surprisingly acknowledged this idea with the statement
that "Yes the spirit is everything" (Binswanger, 1957, p. 81).
Binswanger (1963), however, found Freud qualifying his
remark in the following manner:

"Mankind has always known

that he possesses spirit; I had to show it there are also
instincts" (p. 81).
The central concern of Binswanger's entire work and
life may perhaps best be contained by a Kierkegaardian
motto

that Binswanger himself chose for his breakthrough

essay Dream and Existence (Binswanger, 1963).

"Above all,"

Kierkegaard says, "let us hold on fast onto what it means to
be a man" (Binswanger, 1963, p. 222)

Up to the arrival of

Binswanger, all concerns and research on what it means to
be a man had centered around and been explored by Freudian
psychoanalysis.

But Binswanger found it necessary to include

the study of man in its entirety, not only the abnormal side,
which

Freud

had pursued.

Binswanger emphasized that the

encounter between the analyst and the patient ought to be
more than just another "doctoral appointment;" it should be
a loving one between two human beings.

In fact, Binswanger's

close friend Martin Buber came close to Binswanger's intention

as he spoke of a dialogue in the "I and Thou" sense
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(Buber, 1958).

Buber, who is regarded as an existential

theologian, explained that "I and Thou" is a mutual and open
relation between two individuals.
is characterized by him as

This particular dimension

"The Thou that meets me.

I step into direct relation with him.
being chosen and choosing

But

Hence relation means

My Thou affects me, as I

affect him" (Buber, 1958, pp. 11, 15).
Binswanger's existential analysis (Daseinanalvse) must
not be regarded as a separate school of psychoanalysis,
since its purpose is to "update" or make psychoanalysis a
more effective therapeutic approach (Foy, 1974; May et al.,
1958).

Daseinanalyse, as it is called in German, primarily

sought to "reinstate spirit in the science of psychiatry"
(Needleman, 1963, p. 4).

Needleman (1963) claims this could

only have happened after the emergence of Freud's system.
What the existential approach in fact does is that it
"epitomizes an orientation toward man within psychiatry,
which more than any single difference of viewpoint has set
Daseinanalyse apart from psychoanalysis" (Holt, 1967, p. 95).
Binswanger proposed that scientific psychology and psychiatry
include the ontological problem of man's total being, which
he saw as an indispensable

as well as a strengthening

ingredient of the explanatory power of science.

He is,

thus, not arguing against the explanatory power of psychoanalysis, rather he asks the fundamental and very important
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question:

"What is it in man that enables his existence to

be explained by psychoanalysis?" (Needleman, 1963, P. 4).
The enterprise that Binswanger undertakes requires one
in other words, to go "beyond Freud," by discovering and
capitalizing on "the deep awareness of man's spirit," which
he says is "implicit in many of Freud's statements"
(Binswanger, 1963, p. 184).

Apart from the meeting between

the two referred to above, there is also the example of
Freud's tribute to a close friend, about whom he writes in
the following manner:

"Unforgettable man, to have soared

to such heights of humanity through so much hardship and
suffering!" (Binswanger, 1963, p. 184).

This is very much

reminiscent of what both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche repeatedly
denoted, that in order for man to attain self-realization,
he has to move through feelings of deep anxiety and pain.
Freud, hence, reveals his awareness of human spirituality,
although he never allowed it to interfere with his basic
scientific ideas.
The possibility to understand man's worth and true
being, according to Binswanger (1963), can only be achieved
when viewing man "in the totality of his existence" (p. 185).
By taking this kind of perspective, "we can articulately
recall to ourselves the 'what' and 'how' of being human"
(Binswanger, 1963, p. 185).

Freud's hypothetical constructs

may then be replaced by a "real self-understanding of
humanity", by way of an "insight into man's most basic
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ontological potentialities" (Binswanger, 1963, p. 185).

This

is what Binswanger called "genuine anthropology," a word
which he did not use in the usual cultural meaning, "but
rather in its more strictly etymological sense," or "anthropology as the study of essential meaning and characteristics
of being human" (May et al., 1958, p. 191).
In actuality then, what Binswanger attempted to do was
to restore dimensions of human experience that were often
concealed by psychoanalytic dogma.

He refused to build a

theory "on some rigid assumptions about the nature of
causation" (Holt, 1967, p. 94).

Therefore, as was indicated

earlier, he cannot be said to be the founder of a separate
school of psychoanalysis.

Instead his existential analysis,

as has often been remarked, "has been a widespread, spontaneous, and uncoordinated reaction of many creative individuals to a movement that offered an unduly mechanistic
understanding of the processes of internal human experiences" (Holt, 1967, p. 94).
Freud's systematic explanation of man, in the name of
natural process, Binswanger viewed as an inadequate approach
to genuine anthropology, since he felt this view did not
include emotional aspects of experiential human existence
(Holt, 1967; Needleman, 1963).

Binswanger concluded that,

"human existence could only be understood, by the empiricism
of a phenomenological method"

(Holt, 1967, p. 94), the

language of which he found in the phenomenologl, of Husserl
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and the philosophy of Heidegger.

Above all, his approach to

human existence constituted "a therapy for individuals"
(Holt, 1957, p. 94), something which he thought Freud had
left out

in his assumptions of the nature of therapy.

By

using Heidegger's philosophical insight that "man's existence is defined not by generalities about his nature, but
by the particularity of his individual limits of time and
space, by his existence as a Dasein" (Holt, 1967, p. 95),
Binswanger emphasizes the mutually empathetic relationship
that should exist between the analyst and the patient
(Holt, 1967; Needleman, 1963).

Thus, the aim of every

therapist should be to enter as fully as possible into the
world of the patient and to share it and, eventually, to
show the individual that it is possible to break from a
constrictive private world (Holt, 1967).
It can be said then, that what comprised the genius of
Freud, inadvertently, also constituted the major platform
for existential analytical advancement.

Binswanger (1963)

did recognize Freud's achievement in translating depthpsychological insight into a natural scientific framework,
but he also regarded this as a preoccupation with "homo
natura" (p. 166),

that is to say, an overemphasis on the

exploration of the world of man in his biological environment
(May et al., 1958; Needleman, 1963).

The term Umwelt was

adopted to represent this man-world relationshiu, whereas
"man in personal relations with fellow men" was called
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Mitwelt (May et al., 1958, P. 61).

Binswanger felt that

Freud, because of his exclusive dealina with the past or the
domain of the Umwelt, was prevented from comprehending fully
the Mitwelt and hardly at all the sphere of man in relation
to himself, or the Eiaenwelt (Binswanger, 1963; May et al.,
1958).
It is interesting, therefore, to consider Freud's
relationship to Nietzsche, whom

Freud claimed

had had very

little, if any, influence on psychoanalysis (Jones, 1957).
But in his own words, Freud believed, nonetheless, that
Nietzsche "had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than
any other man who ever lived or was ever likely to live"
(Jones, 1957, p. 344).

In light of this statement, it would

certainly be extraordinary if Nietzsche did not disturb or
influence Freud in the least.

However, Freud was in the

process of laying down the principles of a systematic
theory, and so he was not about to allow any extensive
escapades into the world of Eigenwelt.

Consequently, this

is where Binswanger and others quite clearly differentiate
from the Freudian aim.
In short, then, what is the significance of the existential analytic movement?

This movement, as represented

by Binswanger and others, protested against the preoccupation
of Umwelt on part of classical psychoanalysis.

By so doing,

they did not underestimate the reality of the natural world.
Kierkegaard had earlier pointed out that "natural law is as
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valid as ever" (May et al., 1958, P. 61).

But what was

then true to him was as true to Binswanger later on, that
by overemphasizing biological determinism, "ethical nihilism"
inevitably would result (May et al., 1953, p. 36).

This

would no doubt strip man or deemphasize his individual
make-up.
Binswanger and Husserl
Inadvertently reinforced by Freud's systematic view of
man, Binswanger set out to "design" a phenomenological
anthropology, based on the philosophies of Heidegger and
Husserl.

Binswanger preferred to call it a phenomenological

anthropology, although he let it be understood there was no
separate school as such (Binswanger, 1963).

It was via

these sources, then, that existential analysis or Daseinanalyse came to take on its distinct and unique character.
Husserl, "the father of phenomenology," provided the necessary methodology for Binswanger as well as for Heidegger
and Sartre.

In fact, according to some scholars, had it not

been for Husserl

existentialism would never have gained the

reputation it enjoys today (Breisach, 1962; Spiecelberq,
1972).

It is therefore necessary to consider the main

points of Husserlian influence upon existential analysis
and how Binswanger absorbed them in the context of
Heidegger's being-in-the-world concept.
Husserl had in a lecture, arranged by Binswanger,
pointed out that "unless we become like children" and "look
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for the A B C of consciousness, ... we shall not enter the
kingdom of a true psychology" (Spiegelberg, 1972, p. 365).
Phenomenology is thus defined as "a science of the subjective," that is to say, "the analysis of things as they
appear to human consciousness" (Foy, 1974, p. 927).

Thus

Husserl's main concern, according to Ellenberger (1958),
centered on "the descriptions of states of consciousness
in the purest form, as experienced by the subject" (p. 97).
It should not be surprising, therefore, that this subjective
emphasis attracted Binswanger's attention, as he thought to
get at the innermost feelings of the patient.

Hence the

intentional directness of a phenomenon, combined with its
typical absence of prior assumptions, gave Binswanger the
methodology he needed for his alternative analysis.

By

letting a phenomenon provide its own data through selfdescription, the essential structure of the phenomenon is
revealed as it speaks for itself.

Thus, phenomenologv

could offer an understanding of the world of the patient, as
it is expressed by the patient himself, on his own terms
(Needleman, 1963; Spiegelberg, 1972).
However, it is important to emphasize that "Existential
analysis does not restrict itself to the investigation of
states of consciousness, but takes into account the entire
structure of existence of the individual" (Ellenberger, 1958,
p. 121).

Thus, as Ellenberger also points out, existential

analysis should be viewed as an extension of phenomenology
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as it applies and integrates phenomenology within a larger
frame of reference (Ellenberger, 1958).
Spiegelberg (1972) denotes, furthermore, that although
Binswanger had become attracted to Husserl's idea of intentionality, that is, "a subject pointing to, intending an
object" (Foy, 1974, p. 927), it was not until he discovered
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology that he became
overtly interested.

Binswanger (1958) found the importance

of utilizing the conept of transcendence in Heidegger's
idea of being-in-the-world.

Transcendence implies somethina

toward which the transcendence (to pass or exceed beyond)
is directed, i.e. "world" or one's world-design and,
secondly, that which is being transcended, i.e. "the being
itself" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 193).

Hence, by identifying

being-in-the-world with transcendence, Binswanger stresses
the profound meaning of Heideggerian ontology.

The important

Binswanger (1958) says, is that "the fatal defect
of all psychology has been overcome and the road cleared for
anthropology, the fatal defect being the theory of a dichotomy of world into subject and object" (p. 193).
Thus, Binswanger is avoiding studying human existence
in a reductive sense

as he attempts to replace the man-

environment split by uniting them or, rather, going beyond
the separate worlds of subject and object.

In so doing, he

seeks to establish a general context of meaning in each patient's existence

by the aid of the transcendental category.
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Binswanger and Heidegger
Already the most essential influence of Heidegger upon
Binswanger has been discussed.

This is the concept of

being-in-the-world, which of course is the major ingredient
in Binswanger's psychology, i.e. Daseinanalyse.

The present

author believes, therefore, it would be redundant to further
expound on Heidegger's Dasein.

Suffice to say, however,

that Binswanger's intention in adopting Heidegger's ontology
was purely to complement Freud's analytical techniques, as
well as Husserl's phenomenonology.

Hence, as Needleman

(1963) puts it, "Binswanger ... and his anthropology is
rooted in Heidegger's ontology" (p. 150).
Moreover, as the next chapter of thesis will relate
a particular case study of Binswanger's, Heidegger's meaning
in the context of existential analysis should be obvious.
Like any existentialist, Binswanger is particularly interested in the concept of time.

Thus, the three worlds of his

analysis constitute an important contribution to depth
psychology.

The forthcoming case is, therefore, in effect

a study in time and space, distortion in an attempt to
overcome death and life fears.

Concurrently, this should

bring further meaning to the insights of Kierkegaard, to
whom Binswanger felt indebted (May et al., 1958).
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The Case of Ellen West
This is the case of Ellen West, a schizophrenic personality, which Binswanger himself chose to exemplify and
elucidate his Daseinanalyse.

It has emerged as one of the

most famous and controversial cases in existential psychotherapy (May et al., 1958).

In personal communication with

the present author, Dr. May further affirms this opinion as
he points out that "the case of Ellen West is the most
thoroughly misunderstood case to come from Europe" (May,
1975).

Moreover, despite the seemingly impossible task of

translating Binswanger's complex language into English, this
particular case, nevertheless, became an important contribution to an anthology on existential psychology titled
Existence (May et al., eds., 1958).
In the life of Ellen West we find a psychosis emeraina
underneath an obesity-phobia.

This eventually takes a

catastrophic turn when her life is becoming increasingly
impoverished, up to the point where she decides to take her
own life.

Although the life of Ellen West only spanned some

thirty years, her biography is nonetheless rich with poems,
diaries, and other personal records.

Before being admitted

to the Kreuzlingen sanatorium, which Einswanger himself
headed, Ellen had twice been diagnosed and treated by
orthodox psychoanalysts.

At Kreuzlingen she came under the

care of Bleuler and Kraeplin, two early psychoanalytic
authorities in Switzerland, the location of this sanatorium.
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The existential analytical attempt of this case was done by
Binswanger at a later date and is thus based on the above
mentioned sources of information
(May et al., 1958).

which he himself collected

Hence, there is no indication that

Binswanger ever actively participated in the consultations
with the individual, to whom he later gave the pseudonym
Ellen West (Binswanger, 1958).
Sickness-Unto-Death
In a separate outline on existential analysis (Daseinanalyse), Binswanger (1960) denotes that the aim of this
analytical approach is "to reinstate the human being in his
full humanity, his existence, and his being-in-the-world"
(p. 159).

Thus what Binswanger is talking about is that any

analysis of schizophrenia needs, first of all, to recognize
"those critical moments which are moments of failure in the
process of existence" (Binswanger, 1960, p. 160).

In other

words, what prevents the individual in question to live a
life of being or a world of fruitful experience?

Experience

implies consequence, which in turn tells us of a flowing
sequence of events.

Thus it is within this world of sequen-

tial experiences that interruptions or disturbing gaps emerge.
The schizophrenic usually responds to this vacuous world in
a contradictory and irreconcilable fashion (Binswanger,
1960; 1963; Burton, 1960).

What follows is that the person

is unable to conduct his own life in a "normal" manner
he shuts himself off from others

as well as himself.

as
The
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result is a deteriorization of the self, which rapidly
approaches almost complete stagnation or a condition of
immobility (Burton, 1960; Foy, 1974).

As the schizophrenic

attempts to move on within his confined world, he "shuts
himself off from any possibility of a loving relatedness
with men and the world about him" (Binswanger, 1960, p. 160).
Hence, the person is slowly withdrawing into his Eigenwelt,
as his view of Mitwelt and Umwelt becomes distorted.
The picture that emerges here is, of course, quite
reminiscent of Kierkegaard's idea of sickness-unto-death,
which was expounded on earlier in this Paper (Kierkegaard,
1954).

This is a transpositional concept in which death

has taken the place of life in terms of becoming one's only
hope or a way out of the suffering of life.

But the terror

or despair of this kind of situation is that one cannot die
but has to go on being oneself.

Thus, as Kierkegaard says

"the hopelessness in this case is that even the last hope,
death, is not available" (Kierkegaard, 1954, p. 151).

The

experience of this is therefore the real torment of despair,
which is "the sickness-unto-death, this agonizing contradiction, this sickness in the self, everlastingly to die ...
for dying means that it is all over, but dying the death
means to live to experience death" (Kierkegaard, 1954, p.
151).

This ambivalence or threshold of life and death is

clearly what Ellen West suffered from.

By recognizing this,
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Binswanger simultaneously reveals his proximity to
Kierkegaard (May et al., 1958).
Misguided Ideal
Binswanger emphasized the appearance of vacuums in a
person's experiential continuance, which made it extremely
difficult for the person to go on living.

Nevertheless,

the person invents a set of rigid either/or alternative
solutions

which, because they are unable to help him regain

his uninterrupted sequence of experience, instead constitute
what Binswanger calls "misguided ideals" (Binswanger, 1960,
p. 160).

As far as Ellen West is concerned, we find her

obsession with maintaining slenderness to be her kind of
misguided ideal.

This, in turn, is rigidly contradicted by

the mutually exclusive alternative of gaining weight.

In

order to maintain her misguided ideal, Ellen West invented
all sorts of peculiar devices.

Binswanger described this

as "an attempted masking of the constantly threatening
experience of contradiction" (Binswanger, 1960, u. 162).
As a whole then, these various forms of existence, with
all their mannerisms and peculiarities, need to be understood as "the consequences of the breakdown in the sequential
order of the experience and the resulting experience of
existence with no exits" (Binswanger, 1960, p. 162).

Now,

Ellen West tried to escape her existential anxiety by
desparately turning to her misguided ideal.

The attempted

masking had thus so far provided the necessary cover-up or
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protection from the anxiety of not being able to cope with
life.

However, as soon as this masking process fails, no

more cover or refuge exist and, consequently, the existential
anxiety erupts completely and mercilessly.
Time and Space
As was mentioned at the outset, Ellen West did escape
her agony by way of suicide.

This decision is a crucial

one, for understanding existential thought in psychotherapy
and philosophy, but we must first understand the concepts of
time and space in Ellen's life.

They are important so far

as they relate to Ellen's distortion of the three modes of
existence, i.e. Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Eigenwelt.

In turn,

this will aid the understanding of the difficulties the
person had in bringing harmony to her own life in the face
of death.
To begin with, all the world-regions contained expressions of emptiness, constriction, loneliness, the self, and
the longing for freedom.

In Ellen's diaries and poems one

finds numerous symbols and patterns that signify and express
her various emotions.

In the Umwelt, or the biological

world around us, symbols such as darkness, night, and cold
suggest limitation and emptiness.

Frequently, however,

Ellen pictures herself as being restricted and oppressed in
a hole or tomb

in which her self, a worm, no longer is

capable of freedom.

Thus, it is a hole of empty darkness

as opposed to a sky singing of freedom or, as Binswanger
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has it, the tomb-world versus the ethereal world (Binswanger,
1958; 1963).

Within the Mitwelt, or the I-Thou relation,

i.e. the world of one's fellow men, the hole not only means
loneliness and seclusion but also the suffocating routine
of everyday life, which Binswanger calls Alltag (1958), or
Heidegger das Man (1962).

Finally, in the Eigenwelt or the

relationship to oneself, the longing for freedom is an urge
for independence, defiance, indulgence, and the abandonment
of ideals for the cowardly acceptance of compromises.

The

longing for freedom is seen in her desire to be thin but
simultaneously being oppressed by layers of fat, which
causes her to regard herself as "a mere tube for material
filling-up and reemptying" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 367).
The Concept of Love
It is important to remember here that, because of
Ellen's preoccupation with her body, her psychosis is less
oriented toward the Mitwelt than toward the other two worldregions.

This is seen in the fact that her ability to have

love or friendship for others steadily decreased.

Her body-

preoccupation and the attempted masking thereof also prevented anybody from having what Binswanger calls "Mitweltintercourse" (Binswanger, 1960; 1963).

BY turning inward

she had grown quite irritable and extremely sensitive,
complaining that people did not want to help her, hut rather
preferred to see her suffer.

These barriers that she

increasingly built up accentuate the thoughts of Frieda
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Froram-Reichmann, a notable analyst, who after much experience with schizophrenics arrived at the conclusion that
"schizophrenics were predisposed to require more love than
other people" (Burton, 1960, p. 390).
In the case of Ellen West we find her Dasein or existence almost exclusively ruled by the life-death dichotomy,
which, because of its particular individual nature, allows
for almost no I-Thou love.

This basically Christian concept

of mutual love, of being human, Binswanger (1958) calls
being-in-the-world -beyond-the-world, which to him signifies
an extension of Heidegger's care (Sorge).

Binswanger saw

this, in contrast to his own love-term, as finite and
limiting in its search for authenticity of the Dasein, one's
own existence.

Thus, by contributing this "being-We,"

Binswanger thought he had discovered something by-passed by
Freud and others because, as he points out, "it is the
authentic mode of being-human, the dual mode is the one most
hidden, indeed the one most severely suppressed" (Binswanger,
1958, p. 312).

By necessity, then,because this concept

extends beyond-the-world, this mode restricts itself to
time and space but instead implies eternity or a "meeting
of I and Thou in the eternal moment of love" (Binswanger,
1958, p. 312).
Binswanger states that in Ellen's life there are moments
whe love is "at least shimmering through," which he says are
Ellen West's "readiness for Thou" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 313).
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Moreover, it is true that, as Binswanger (1958) says, "even
the reader of her case history must have seen Ellen West
not only as an object of interest but also as Thou" (p. 313).
Certainly this further stresses his point of the subtle,
ever-presence of mutual love.

By delineating the diffi-

culties Ellen West experienced in her Mitwelt world, we may
well understand the extreme predominance of her Eigenwelt.
She is completely entangled in her self-made or chosen net
of bodily spheres, which on a deeper level comprise her
existential alternatives.

These are "deficient existential

modes" and, in the final analysis also self-destructive,
since instead of providing a way out to a rendez-vous with
her lost being, they severe her existential crisis to the
point where catastrophy is the only remaining solution
(Binswanger, 1958; 1963).
The Death of Ellen West
We now arrive at perhaps the most crucial point in the
life of Ellen West, namely when she decides to take her own
life.

So far she has been constantly torn between the fear

of life and death or, as Binswanger would say, thrown
between the realization of the tomb-world and the ethereal
world (Binswanger, 1958; 1963).

The following poem by Ellen

gives us an opportunity to see exactly this.
it reveals to us Ellen the artist
paints her existential crisis

Furthermore,

as she, full of energy,

in which we can detect, in

particular, the suffering she finds herself in:
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I'd like to die just as the birdling does
That splits his throat in highest jubilation;
And not to live as the worm on earth lives on,
Becoming old and ugly, dull and dumb!
No, feel for once how forces in me kindle,
And wildly be consumed in my own fire.
Although the above poem, as was indicated earlier,
shows Ellen creating, there is also the indifference or the
She consoles in the fact

very dull and impersonal Alltag.

that eventually, at some point in the future, death would
release her from these chains.

In her diary she writes

longingly about this final event:
stretching out and dozing off.

"Such a delicious

Then it's over.

No more

getting up and dreary working and planning ... Death is
the greatest happiness in life, if not the only one.
hope of the end of the life would be unendurable.

Without

Only the

certainty that sooner or later the end must come consoles
me a little" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 242-243).
Now the question arises, to what extent can suicide
provide a meaningful exit?

Binswanger responds that the

only time when the sensing and knowing of love breaks
through is in the face of death.

It reveals a great deal

about Ellen West, that in spite of the pressure of not being
able to achieve this breakthrough

in life, it still shows

itself in the imminence of death.

This is very much remi-

niscent of the being-in-the-world-beyond-the-world, which

60
literally tells this experience takes place in another
dimension.

Typically, this is an experience of extreme

insight, and where time feels as if still, and every
moment filled with pregnant meaning (May et al., 1958).
That is what Tillich had in mind when he said that the
"courage to be is rooted in the God who appears when God
has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt" (Tillich, 1952,
p. 190).

The achievement of this stage reveals Being by

way of courage.

Tillich (1952) called it "God above God"

(p. 186), when man has taken upon himself "the anxiety of
meaninglessness" (p. 190) and thus transcended it.
"The God above God" or the experience of love beyondbeing -in-the-world, that Tillich (1952) and Binswanger
(1958) termed the authentic state of existence, seems to
coincide amazingly with the final hours in the life of Ellen
West.

At this point, in midst of despair, she is very

courageous
torment.

as she decides to bring about an end to her

As soon as she had made UP her rind to commit

suicide, she is "as if transformed ... for the first time
in thirteen years! - she is satisfied by her food and gets
really full ... she reads poems by Rilke, Storm, Goethe,
and Tennyson" (Binswanaer, 1958, p. 267).

On the following

day she is dead, after taking poison the night before, and
"she looked as she had never looked in life - calm and happy
and peaceful" (Binswanger, 1958, p. 267).

Did this sudden

transformation in fact signify, through her courage, Ellen's
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achievement of authenticity or individuation?
approach and analysis is that she did.

Binswanger's

In spite of the

anxiety, Ellen went beyond her dichotomous life-death anxiety
and created, chose something strictly her own, namely the
way she was going to die.

And to choose one's course of

life is very existential indeed.
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Concluding Remarks
In light of the case of Ellen West, the similarities
between all the thinkers mentioned appear to be quite substantial.

To begin with, the four existentialists presented

in the current thesis

all seem to agree about the plight

of man or his funJamental condition.
they say, is tragic.

Man's sense of life,

And unless we cease evading death, by

conforming to the everydayness of average man, we will never
realize our potentialities.

Hence, what is required of the

individual is the courage or will to stand up and face the
fact of mortality.

As we realize our finitude, life suddenly

becomes dear and potentially meaningful.

It is the "throw-

ness" or the feeling of being-cast-into-world, as Heidegger
calls it, that overwhelms the individual with both life and
death fears.

And it is out of proper or creative choosing

that he has the possibility to go beyond himself or his own
individuality.
Although the four authors of different existentialhumanistic schools speak with a different tongue or perspective, their languages appear to coincide.
exception is Binswanger

An important

who,of course, primarily views

himself as a methodologist.

Thus, one finds Binswanger

talks very little about the life/death fear as such

as he

seeks to establish a phenomenological anthropology and,
hence, seems more inclined to wanting to go beyond the
three modes of worlds (Umwelt, Mitwelt, Eigenwelt).

On the
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other hand, both to Kierkeaaard and Rank, the problem of
duality emerges.

Hence, Rank's neurotic artist basically

suffers from sickness-unto-death, as he is seen as being
thrown between either fear of life or fear of death.

As

has been pointed out earlier, sickness-unto-death is what
Ellen West suffered from, until the amazing thing happens
when she realizes that she possesses the potentials to
create something unique beyond life and death.
Consequently, if Ellen is viewed as the artist, it would
appear correct to analyze her in terms of creativity.

Her

problem as an artist is that she does not possess the creative courage to express herself fruitfully.
nothingness held a firm grip on her,

It is as if

the more amazing then,

when she discovers her own immortality beyond the earthbound.

On this dimension we have seen all the theorists

express themselves.

Thus both Kierkegaard and Heidegger

talk about the enrichment and fulfillment of Self or Being,
either by way of faith or care.

Binswanger seems to go a

step beyond Heidegger, as he emphasizes his love concept as
the potential source of eternal authenticity.

Finally, Rank

explains that the rational and irrational forces combine to
move individuality beyond itself.
The significance of Ellen West's life, hence, appears
to boil down to those few moments before her physical death.
Perhaps Martin Buber in his I and Thou (1958) tells it all:
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"The word of revelation is I am that I am.
reveals is that which reveals.
nothing more.

That which

That which is is, and

The eternal source of strength streams, the

eternal contact persists, the eternal voice sounds forth,
and nothing more" (p. 112).
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